X-Message-Number: 27588 Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2006 11:57:51 -0500 Subject: Coffee From: <> >> I suppose RBR's answer will be that the cup of coffee I started out with does not have an "identity". << Wrong. All existent things described by nouns have 'identities'--- or those nouns would have no utility and consequently not exist within the language. By 'cup of coffee', I'll take an educated guess on a predicate and say that x is a cup of coffee if P(x) obtains, where P(x) = 'x defines a volume of matter in which there exists a cup filled with at least 50% coffee' (although pity the soul who tries to serve me a cup of coffee that's only half full). In such a case, the act of continuously drinking and refilling a cup does not alter the identity of the 'cup of coffee' as defined here. In other words, the cup of coffee you end up with at the end of the day is the same cup of coffee (has the same identity) as the one you started out with in the morning. If this strikes you as odd it's only because your mind is incapable of holding the defined predicate in mind when thinking about a 'cup of coffee', and the alternate predicate you're thinking of (which no doubt involves the atoms of the coffee) clashes with the defined predicate. This particular example is not very applicable to the case of cryonics: in cryonics, we're concerned with preservation of functional properties; viz., those properties that enable me to experience the world, subjectively. So perhaps a more telling analogy would be a coffee pot, whose predicate would involve the functional property of being able to make a cup of coffee. >> And at which point during that period of years, does it stop having the same identity it originally had? Or does it stop? If not, why? << If by 'identity', you are referring to the identity of my 'ability to experience', then my brain will have the same (ability-to- experience) identity for as long as I live, regardless of the individual atoms that make up my brain. Why? Because throughout that time period (and perhaps beyond it, with cryonics), the predicate 'P(x) = x has the ability to experience' holds continuously, even as the atoms of my brain are changing. Functional invariance implies identity invariance with respect to that function. You would have known all this if you had *comprehended* my definition. You know, if you don't understand something I say, you can always ask for clarification. >> But I remember RBR running off with his tail between his legs, some time ago, << Please refer me to a single message that I did not respond to. Conversations between me and others terminate because (a) people run out of ways to rationalize their belief in the immaterial and therefore abandon continued discourse; and (b) I become too busy in my professional life to stir up more trouble. Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=27588