X-Message-Number: 30043
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2007 06:45:36 -0800 (PST)
From: un person <>
Subject: fear of death overcome by dissociative trance?

--0-194724407-1195656336=:51699


I got ahold of an ecopy of a book named THE CORRUPTION OF REALITY by Schumaker. 
A review of it is appended below.
   

  I am only just starting to read the book, but I can see already that it is a 
  work of genius. 
   

  From what I can see, the main thesis is that in order for us to function 
  (knowing that we will die and all the other burdens of reality that our 
  advanced cognitive abilities heap upon us) we need to be able to set aside 
  some of this terrible knowledge. We need to sort of forget it, the better to 
  function.
   

  Schumaker posits that religion -- especially as it is practiced in primitive 
  cultures (with ritual trance practices) -- allows humans to do this. These 
  dissociative trance states allow us to compartmentalize this terrible 
  knowledge of death, or disorder, entropy, cold hard reality, etc. 
   
  Hyponosis is a form of this altered state.
   

  Drug use, overeating, and other psychopathologies are attempts in western 
  cultures to find a way to compartmentalize and forget terrible knowledge.
   

  Schumaker asserts that going into a trance state is a SKILL, a necessary one. 
  One that westerners have lost.

  Schumaker is greatly influenced by Ernest Becker, who was a primary influence 
  on those who developed the Terror Management theories that are more or less 
  the catalyst for many of the recent fear of death discussions here on cryonet 
  (whether you realize it or not...).
   

  Fascinating book. It also reinforces my theories (as often posted here on 
  cryonet and scoffed at, of course) that religion is a necessary part of 
  humanity (I say this as an atheist), and that the reason cryonics has not 
  taken off is that we have failed to integrate cryonics into religion.
   
   
  enjoy!

  (oh, and since cryonet is so anal compulsive on message length, I suppose this
  book review will be truncated, so here is the url:
   
  http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/book264.htm
   
   

  The Corruption of Reality, John F. Schumaker. New York: Prometheus Books, 
  1995. 289pp. 
Reviewed by Jerry S. Piven - Syracuse University

  This book is a fascinating study of the relation between religion, hypnosis, 
  and psychopathology. Schumaker observes that most non-Western societies 
  involve hypnosis in their healing practices, and that all religion is founded 
  upon an unmistakably hypnotic component. Hence, the connection between the 
  hypnotic processes of religion and the capacity to heal. He concludes that 
  religion, hypnosis, and psychopathology are "overlapping manifestations of a 
  general human faculty" for dealing with emotional stress. 

  Because the human organism is beset by terror and anxiety, its increased 
  intelligence and awareness require the evolutionary strategy of seeking 
  sanctuary in illusion (i.e. shared group-fantasy) and self-deception to 
  survive. Schumaker follows Otto Rank and Ernest Becker in asking the question 
  "on what level of illusion were we meant to live?" Group-fantasy must 
  obfuscate reality for everyone in a community, or else it will be susceptible 
  to doubt. Hence these illusions are shared religious fantasies which relieve 
  anxiety on a social scale. Religion is a means of psychological dissociation 
  from pain and reality, a "strategic reality corruption designed to serve the 
  individual and society."

  Schumaker envisions reality as the essential source of human strife, and our 
  capacity to transcend and regulate reality through illusion as man's central 
  psychological dynamic. When our capacity to dissociate fails, we are beset by 
  overwhelming anxiety and respond by creating our own self-deceptive shared 
  fantasies. Psychopathology is a personal version of illusion erupting when 
  social forms of dissociation and hypnosis fail. Thus religion, hypnosis, and 
  psychopathology as different versions of the same project: the need to 
  regulate reality.

  The essence of normality is, as Becker asserts, the "refusal of reality." 
  Schumaker defines health not in terms of the mind in touch with reality, but 
  as the capacity not to perceive reality in certain ways. We tend to define 
  health in terms of the capacity to perceive reality accurately, but in 
  Schumaker's view, human beings must dissociate a portion of reality in order 
  not to go insane. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that many 
  suffering from psychological symptoms are debilitated by their inability to 
  block out certain aspects of reality from conscious awareness. 

  Schumaker's analysis of religion and psychopathology in terms of illusion and 
  self-deception is persuasive and elegant. His thesis that normalcy consists of
  pervasive avoidances of reality is highly compelling, and he uses the 
  brilliant yet largely ignored innovations of Becker and Rank very well to make
  his case. We are given a tremendous amount of information on dissociation. 
  His citation and elucidation of empirical research on the subject is very 
  useful. His view that man's ability to function "normally" requires the 
  ability to obscure portions of reality and create illusions/shared fantasies 
  is supported by extensive literature. 

  But this book has very real faults. It is extremely repetitive. This is 
  necessary at times, but much of it recapitulates the same ideas without 
  improving upon the argument. Schumaker is innovative when he combines Freud 
  and Becker with recent empirical data, but he also recycles their material 
  unnecessarily.

  A second key problem with Schumaker's argument is that it is pervaded by 
  discussions of dissociation, without really explaining the qualities of shared
  fantasy that engender conception and corruption of reality. Dissociation 
  tends to be an avoidance of a portion of reality, and Schumaker thoroughly 
  explains how this works. However, psychological reality is not merely a 
  narrowed-down reality, a diminished perceptual set, but consists of a dynamic 
  fantasy life which actually corrupts and reshapes reality actively.

  Unlike psychohistorians, Schumaker makes no real attempt to explain modes of 
  fantasy construction, what kinds of fantasies people have, and by what 
  dynamics they can replace reality. He assumes that fantasies are provided to a
  society rather than generated in shared fashion by members. The dynamic is 
  interactive, and cannot be reduced to a merely passive situation where a 
  society simply inherits belief systems. Groups also change and discard beliefs
  which no longer meet their needs, and they invent fantasies in reaction to 
  their current problems. According to Schumaker, individuals only construct 
  illusions when they have no socially cohesive fantasies to believe in. The 
  process is much more complex than constructing shared illusions when social 
  illusions are no longer satisfying. He also avoids the question of what 
  fantasies appeal to individuals and societies. 

  He wrongly assumes individuals have no illusions or psychopathology when 
  socially coherent fantasies are available. Avoiding these salient aspects of 
  psychodynamics gives an impression that human beings exist in tune with 
  reality to the extent that they merely avoid noticing what is painful. In fact
  this is only a small part of cognition, perception, and reality distortion. 
  Psychopathology is not a lack of illusions. Trauma, developmental 
  vicissitudes, and experiences determine psychological functioning well before 
  the impact of religion on a community becomes psychologically salient for the 
  individual. Unloving or abusive parents, the death of loved ones, excessive 
  frustration and anxiety, can all engender pathology which will not be relieved
  by socially prescribed fantasies, though one might pursue such fantasies in 
  hope for such relief. One might claim that if the parents were themselves 
  faithfully religious, they would not inflict their own pathologies on their

 children, and hence their children would have no need to construct personal 
 symptoms. But this is false. Faithful parenting is not a bulwark against trauma
 and debilitation. It obscures the underlying impact of parental/developmental 
 destructiveness. 

  Indeed, it might be the very socially cohesive fantasy itself which is 
  responsible for the parental abuse or developmental damage in the first place.
  A variety of religious, sacred, and socially sanctioned parenting practices 
  are clearly destructive. Indeed, even without citing the countless examples of
  socially sanctioned physical mutilation, torture, and abuse around the world,
  one needs to look no further than into the heartland of the morally pure to 
  observe debilitating abuses and traumatic repressions. Social sanction is a 
  virtual guarantee that psychopathology will go unnoticed, rather than a 
  panacea against anxiety.

  Schumaker's view also makes it seem that people believe whatever social 
  fantasy is provided to alleviate anxiety. In reality, communities have 
  fantasies that reflect the needs and anxieties of their particular situations,
  even if they often have dynamics of fantasies in common. Not any fantasy will
  do. Thus, we must understand that the illusory aspects of religious and 
  social belief are comprised not just of relief for anxiety, but specific 
  shared fantasies generated by developmental issues and social experiences. The
  need for parental protection, to deny death, to control the environment 
  ritually, to define the sacred, profane, pure and impure, may derive from 
  similar dynamics; but their content varies according to the variations of the 
  culture. These fantasies are not interchangeable.

  A further problem is that Schumaker never allows for the possibility that 
  development determines the extent to which people need illusions. He assumes 
  that those who are not religious have either dissociated their anxiety to find
  another cohesive ideology to make it go away, they have dissociated their 
  anxiety in service of forming neurotic symptoms, they have dissociated their 
  anxiety to appear functional, or they are constitutionally (biologically) 
  endowed with a greater capacity for pain. Schumaker never considers whether 
  people need to evade reality to different degrees. Individuals vary intensely 
  with regard to how they experience separation from their parents, how 
  confidently they pursue their interests, how guilty they feel, how violent 
  they are. 

  Schumaker's central thesis, that reality is terrifying to everyone and that we
  all engage in self-deceptions and corruptions of reality, must be granted. 
  But his view of religion and dissociation ignores that individuals vary not 
  only in terms of the kinds of reality which are satisfying or terrifying, but 
  that some are far more terrified than others. And this is not on the basis of 
  having socially coherent illusions alone, but because of vast differences in 
  development which render them more or less suggestible (psychologically, not 
  biologically), more or less inclined to deceive themselves, more or less in 
  need of illusions, more or less capable of perceiving and enduring reality. 

  Finally, Schumaker claims that the solution for modern neurotic misery is to 
  restore religion to a central place in both society and therapy. Lack of 
  spiritual communication in therapy has been noted by many. Individuals need to
  come to terms with life, death, questions of meaning, loss, and anguish. Such
  issues can often get too little attention, especially in an age of increasing
  use of medication. Effort toward a more spiritual psychotherapy are reflected
  in the work of existential psychologists, like Ludwig Binswanger and Rollo 
  May. 

  But the search for a spiritual connection is not the same as suggesting or 
  inculcating illusions, especially religious ones. The transition from the 
  spiritual to the religious can be a fine line which must not be crossed by 
  therapists if it means implanting illusions. Schumaker advocates a spiritual 
  journey, but what he actually prescribes is something far more questionable. 
  The use of deception in the clinic can be a serious abuse of power. Is the 
  therapist a Grand Inquisitor, who decides to fool the patient with miracle, 
  mystery and authority, because that is what the patient truly needs to 
  survive? Which illusions are acceptable? Who is to decide? Does the therapist 
  determine what illusions are necessary, just how much reality the patient must
  escape? Knowing that human beings need some shared illusion to survive is not
  the same as deciding for someone what illusions they need. 

  Schumaker says that therapists should explicitly attempt to provide a coherent
  and religious world view which ameliorates the anxiety of social doubt and 
  the difficulty of faith in a society of contrasting belief and opinion. If we 
  suffer from a lack of socially coherent shared illusions, then we need to 
  therapeutically reinforce such illusions in order to form a convincing, 
  totalized illusion system impervious to doubt, threat, skepticism, and loss of
  faith.

  This is wrong, because implementing such a solution could only be accomplished
  by fascistic means. A society would have to brainwashed and purged of 
  disbelief (or disbelievers) to truly eradicate any traces of contrary ideology
  or skepticism which might interfere with a ubiquitous illusion. All contrary 
  opinion, questions, and creative thought must be censored to achieve a faith 
  immune from doubt. Scientific thinking and inquiry must also be censored 
  because they may lead to the collapse of belief. This tyranny is also 
  furthered by the necessity of deciding which fantasy system is going to be the
  apposite and holy choice. The establishment of such a universal faith is 
  morally reprehensible and socially debilitating.

  Even if faith were somehow bestowable by a therapist without doubt or 
  fascistic means, this still begs the question of whether faith is 
  psychologically healthy, and whether the inculcation of faith has any place in
  the clinic. Even though we may to some extent need shared illusions to 
  survive, does this make them helpful in therapy?

  Schumaker's conclusions seem to ignore such important therapeutic discoveries 
  that people function better when they are helped to confront their conflicts 
  and become aware of their problems. Ignorance of one's psychopathology only 
  allows conflict to flourish and supports a dysfunctional ignorance of 
  problems. Shared illusions offer some measure of immediate gratification, but 
  they also allow problems to persist without any awareness of the genuine 
  suffering conflicts usually cause.

  The author claims that if we were truly religious, symptoms might not occur. 
  But this is fallacious. To claim that symptoms can erupt when faith diminishes
  may be true, but this does not automatically make faith healthy. 
  Psychopathology can and does exist in religious individuals and religious 
  societies. Pathological symptoms, including mass hysteria, paranoia, psychotic
  delusion, and mass violence, permeate the history of most religions. Just 
  because individuals in a society display traits in common, or are relieved of 
  certain forms of anxiety by a shared belief, does not in any way indicate the 
  health or morality of such illusions.

  Schumaker's view defines successful treatment in terms of whatever reduces 
  pain, regardless of the consequences for the individual, or those he or she 
  interacts with. Shall we tell paranoiacs that their delusions are correct? 
  They will feel happy for the moment. Or is there perhaps another aim in 
  treatment?

  The question of what illusions can actually be healthy is far more complicated
  than Schumaker believes, and he does not recognize that illusions can not 
  only obfuscate genuine problems, but often create more suffering than they 
  supposedly alleviate. It is surprising that he does not realize this, since he
  quotes Becker to the effect that "religion confers upon people a social 
  license to act out madness." To state that pathology appears in times of doubt
  and loss of faith is obvious. To state that pathology is simply the opposite 
  of illusion is patently false. Certainly the solution is not mass avoidance of
  reality. We've had quite enough of that already.

  As with many great works, The Corruption of Reality provides a highly rich, 
  compelling, and innovative set of findings, but it falls apart when advocating
  social solutions to human misery. The book's central thesis concerning the 
  pervasive human need for shared illusion/fantasy and the normalcy of reality 
  avoidance is well argued and of use for psychohistorians, but only if we are 
  clear about its problems.


       
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