X-Message-Number: 32303
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 20:46:17 +0100 (CET)
From: 
Subject: Aw: CryoNet #32294 - #32299
References: <>


For the majority of cryonicists, uploading must be certainly no alternative of 
superior or equivalent value in most cases. But there are a few cases where 
mental and social imbalances make it unaffordable or insufferable for those 
concerned to finance cryonics. Only a few cryonicists belong to those who are 
affected by a generally notable form of mental illness or social oppression 
which includes the risk of homelessness in various regions. Taking this into 
consideration, we must learn about the difference between a better alternative 
of superior value and a makeshift alternative of inferior value. The inferior 
value of cryonics perceived by the entire global population is shifting to a 
superior value for a comparatively small group of cryonicists who find it 
affordable or sufferable enough to sign up for cryonic suspension. However, not 
all cryonicists can overcome mental and social imbalances to shift through.


Mind uploading offers the uploading of an individual's self which is reparable 
to a former state of living. It requires the preservation of the brain including
it's cellular structure where living species of higher mammals consider their 
self. Without the preservation of the brain, uploading has little value for 
repair of self and mind towards a former state of living. But such a case 
renders some superior value for various data about a self which are not living, 
but still bound to personal action. This way, repair and consolidation with AI 
of self and mind will be directed away from a former state of death.


For a cryopreserved brain we think, some internal parts of personality are 
stored in the front left lobe. Yet, brains aren't directly living within cryonic
suspension. Neither a curriculum vitae nor a personal data sheet are living, 
but they are viable statements about important parts of personality too. 
Therefore, uploading of such data into a digital creature in cyberspace still 
has value for the repercussion of some external parts from the self which should
be considerably useful data. Yet, it's value is still low to the majority of 
successful cryonicists. But for the rest, uploading without preserved brain 
tissue represents the better alternative to a classic death which usually goes 
along without any viable preservation of external personality-related 
information for uploading.

Incl. subject: Re: Uploading and Survival
Luke Parrish writes in part:
> 
> 
> But one thing I haven't seen mentioned here is that uploading as an
> alternative
> to cryonics is really a red herring. Cryonics preserves the individual for
> either
> reanimation *or* uploading -- or anything in between, for that matter --
> which 
> may become possible in the future. There is no competition between cryonics
> and uploading, only between reanimation and simulation. If you are not
> cryopreserved, you can't be uploaded after you die, because we do not have
> the
> technology to create a sufficiently detailed digital scan at present.

///



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