X-Message-Number: 32540
From: 
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 2010 21:32:32 EDT
Subject: Arcturus comments

2Arcturus' remarks below have some problems.
 
>Since the mind is not defined materially, it does not make  sense to 
regard this as a copy. The mind that >resumed would be the same  mind, just 
supported by a different substrate, in different  circumstances
 
Mental activity is material, like all other activity. A simulation is  

indeed an attempted copy. To say it is the "same mind" supported by a different
substrate is to buy the information paradigm, which is only a mantra.
 
Also, it is not true that enhancement of our brains requires uploading. All 
 the powers of a computer could be attached to or incorporated into the 
organic  brain--the computer can be an extension of the person, or a tool of 
the person,  not a replacement. 
 
I may try another focus message.
 
Robert Ettinger
 
 
In a message dated 4/4/2010 5:00:36 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
 writes:


Message #32532
References:  <>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2010  11:31:47 -0700 (PDT)
From: 2Arcturus  <>
Subject: Thought experiment  &  survival

--0-1437903262-1270319507=:58810

In trying to do a  thought experiment about whole brain emulation, it's 
taking a wrong turn to  imagine yourself as you are now alongside the 

emulation. If it were done for  the purpose of survival, then by that condition,
your 
current mind would no  longer be continued, and so in a sense, it would not 
exist -- for example, the  mindlessness of cryopreservation, deeper than 
any coma or other kind of  unconsciousness. So the proper way to do the 

thought experiment would be to  compare the emulation to the continuation of the
body you have now, which  would have no active mind. 

Ideally, the emulation would support the  entire process of your embodied 
mind, resuming from the point where it left  off in your present body. Since 
the mind is not defined materially, it does  not make sense to regard this 
as a copy. The mind that resumed would be the  same mind, just supported by a 
different substrate, in different  circumstances, and it would be the only 
such mind in existence, if it were  done for the purposes of survival. Yes, 
emulation raises the possibility of  copying, as well as merging, splitting, 
enhancement, and a million other  possibilities, but for the purposes of a 
thought experiment about survival,  copying is not the issue. So then, if 
you imagine what it would feel like to  be this emulation, by definition, it 
would have to feel exactly the same as  you would feel, if you were to find 
yourself in that circumstance, except for  your body (although if that were 
identical also, you would feel no difference  in your embodiment,
either).

As we all know, cryonics is only a  partial solution to the problem of 
death, not a complete solution. There are  innumerable ways the brain can be 
destroyed, for example, in an explosion or  fire, or by a neurodegenerative 

disease, or crushed beyond the ability of any  computation or scaled technology
to reconstruct. Those of us who are  transhumanist are also dedicated to 
enhancing the mind in an unlimited  direction, which would not really be 
possible if were to remain bound by the  constraints of the organic brain's 

biochemical processes. Maybe other  alternatives will be found in the future, 
but 
for now, brain emulation and  emulation on more flexible substrates offer 
the only hope for a comprehensive  solution to the danger of death and 
unlimited advancement of the human  mind.






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