X-Message-Number: 32868 References: <> Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2010 10:57:24 -0700 (PDT) From: 2Arcturus <> Subject: Re: Uploading (CryoNet #32861 - #32865) --0-977944254-1285437444=:59466 In regard to the "copy vs. original" problem, here is another analogy- Imagine you invent a time machine, and are able to go back in time, and you do so, and use the time machine to come into the presence of yourself just before you invent the time machine. Setting aside the time travel paradox issues, reflect on the situation. There are two people, simulataneous, occupying different spatial positions, and with slightly different minds (based on the slight difference in memories between the two "you"s). But would you be able to conclude that one is -you-, while the other is not? Would you decide that one 'you' is the original, authentic you, while the other is a copy/duplicate/counterfeit you? Probably not. You would probably agree that both instances of you are in fact completely, authentically, you. So you have two simultaneous, slightly divergent and diverging 'you's. Once you have understood this, the second question is whether 'you' would survive in an authentic sense if either of you were to be destroyed. Both of you, as you, have the survival instinct that 'you ' have. So neither of you would want, at a gut level, to be destroyed, and both of you, at a gut level, would want to be the 'one' who survives. But using the previous conclusion, you understand, intellectually, that both instances of you are in fact the same person, the same 'you', even though technically, at this moment and in this unusual situation, 'you' are realized in two embodiments which can be practically distinguished. No logic could quiet the 'gut' sense that destruction of either one of you would -feel- like non-survival, but the consistent, rational conclusion is that the survival of either of you would be the survival of 'you', because both instances of you are, in fact, completely you, the same person (although with slight mental divergences). Now this "copy vs original" question comes up with any mention of uploading, but this would most likely not be a practical issue, since if one were uploaded directly from a cryopatient who had not been resuscitated, there would not be two running instances of ''you' - the cryopatient instance of you would not be experience a survival instinct, and the living (uploaded) instance of you, of course, would not have to be destroyed. The 'copy vs. original' question would just concern the question of whether you had authentically survived as yourself, the same person. And I want to clarify for my own position - when I am talking about uploading, I am not defending the idea that current computer hardware could support a human mind. I do not believe this is possible and I do not know anyone who takes this position, so it is basically a straw man if anyone is arguing against that. Also, I do not believe that any form of 'uploading' would be optimal if it did not allow the uploaded person to be embodied, to be in a free-standing, free moving, sensing body, one that could (if desired) appear outwardly exactly like the human body, even if it looked different inside or if it was of some different nature. So I am not supporting any kind of disembodied existence as pure mind - something resembling 'locked in' syndrom of stroke patients, which is a nightmarish circumstance of being cut off from sensing the world, being able to manipulate the world, being able to interact with other people as they are, etc. The sort of uploading principle I am supporting is simply the principle that the information present in a human brain could be transferred to another body, organic or mechnical, so that the same person could be embodied that way. And again, I do not believe that the abstracted information about the brain itself would be the person, and I do not know anyone who takes that position, so again, it is a straw man if anyone is arguing against that. A recipe for cake is not a cake - you cannot eat the recipe. But the recipe, along with a good chef, a kitchen, and basic ingredients, could RESULT in a cake, exactly like any other cake, and an edible one at that. --0-977944254-1285437444=:59466 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 [ AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPING HTML ENCODING! ] Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=32868