X-Message-Number: 3295
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 1994 15:23:12 -0400
From: 
Subject: SCI. CRYONICS survival

Neuroscientist Joseph Strout has commented on criteria of survival (#3289).
This pressed my button again, and I want to reiterate briefly my current
opinion, and ask if Dr. Strout (or others) can cast any light.

First, I think NOBODY has made anywhere near a decent case for any sensible
criteria of identity/survival, EITHER necessary or sufficient. 

Using various thought experiments, nothing works--as far as I can see. For
example, on the question  of whether duplicates would share identity or would
be the "same " person, I find the positive and negative conclusions equally
acceptable and equally unacceptable--although, again, "acceptability" is not
necessarily the proper criterion for criteria.

I once more emphasize two points, on both of which I seem to be a
long-wailing voice in the wilderness:

1. Although not the only important consideration, the ESSENCE of selfhood or
personhood is in that portion or aspect of the brain (I call it the "self
circuit") that allows or gives rise to FEELING (and hence consciousness,
which is the integration of feeling and computing). Turing-tested "people"
are not necessarily people; it is the internal state that counts. 

This does not, of course, speak to the "duplicate" question, but it shifts
the emphasis from memory and personality to the subjective condition, where
it belongs. The subjective condition is influenced by memory and personality,
but is prior to them.

2. We will probably never have any real grip on the problem until we
understand more about the physics and psychology of TIME.  

Are there "chronons" of time or atoms of spacetime? Is the world
discontinuous? What about the speculations on quantum effects creating loops
in time? What about the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum physics and
its implications for replication/survival?

What is the objective length of the subjective present? Is it always 1/20
second or thereabouts, or more variable? 

To feel is (?) to feel that something is HAPPENING. Can a single subjective
state encompass a happening? If not, does a single person demand the union of
at least two successive subjective states?

CONCLUSIONS: After millions of words, these questions remain wide open. If I
had to make a bet right now, I would bet that survival is an illusion (and
therefore I can't collect the bet)--that my past, present, and future
"selves" cannot be considered the "same" person by any rigorous and
appropriate criterion. But my gut says that we will find more acceptable
answers when we know more about the physics and the physiology.

Robert Ettinger
Cryonics Institute

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