X-Message-Number: 3663
From: (Joseph J. Strout)
Newsgroups: sci.cryonics
Subject: Re: survival, misc.
Date: 9 Jan 1995 22:38:07 GMT
Message-ID: <>
References: <3eq5ce$>
Robert Ettinger wrote a thoughtful post on a variety of philosophical
issues involved with uploading...
In article <3eq5ce$>, he wrote:
> Third, thought experiments alone will not solve our problem, although they
> can help a little. On the basis of thought experiments, for example, it seems
> to me equally difficult to believe that continuity is important or that it is
> not important, that a duplicate is you or is not you. We need more than
> thought experiments: we need more information, in particular on the self
> circuit and on time or space-time.
I agree that physical experimentns arer to be preferred over hypothetical
ones, but it is not clear what experiments could address questions such as
these. The central question -- what it is that defines a person's identity
-- may be defined a variety of ways, with the knowledge that we already have.
Additional data from neuroscience or physics will probably not leave a single
possible definition. Our task is to come up with a definition that is
logically consistent and (cringe) emotionally satisfying -- that is,
describes the concept that people naturally approximate when they say "I".
> Second, I have repeatedly and emphatically insisted that intelligence is not
> the stuff of life or humanity or consciousness: the central role goes to
> FEELING, the capacity to experience pleasure and pain and the like, the
> subjective condition.
This is an excellent point, and it leads to the conclusion that behavioral
tests cannot determine consciousness, since (in theory) a device could be
built that acts as though it has subjective feeling, when in fact it has
none. However, the possibility exists (and is perhaps quite likely) that no
such device is possible, given sufficiently sophisticated tests. I suspect,
as others have implied, that consciousness confers upon the bearer certain
abilities not otherwise attainable. These will most likely lie in the realm
of empathy, social interaction, estimating others' motives, and so on. In
short: I suspect that consciousness (or, as I prefer, "self-awareness") is
not something you can fake.
> We must first discover the physical nature of the self circuit in animals;
> after that we will be in a better position to speculate whether it can exist
> on an inorganic substrate and what a generalized rquirement might be.
While I am not sure exactly what this "self circuit" is or how we would know
it when we see it, I think I can describe its physical nature (or at least
its components). It's made of mostly neurons, with possibly some roles
played by glia, and a few other cell types joined in specific ways to form a
system, located mostly in the brain. The components of this system follow
rules, and activity in the system parallels experience of the person or
animal. Physical evidence is available in at least two forms. First, damage
to most areas of the brain results in specific deficits, often in a person's
awareness -- for example, a patient may be able to describe an object with
perfect clarity, yet have no idea what it is or what it might be used for
(see "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat"), or may lose any ability to
experience color -- not just to SEE color, mind you, but to even remember
what colors are or what they looked like. Second, activity in specific brain
areas, as detected by such techniques as PET or MRI, reflects the subject's
mental activity -- forming a mental image, for example, or performing mental
arithmetic. To me, this is powerful evidence that the "self" is nothing more
than the activity of our wonderfully complicated nervous system. What
additional evidence (or, perhaps, level of detail) do you require before
you could be satisfied?
Given that the mind (and its subjective experience) arise from the activity
of the brain, there is no reason to suppose that it can't be reproduced in
another form. A simulation of a hydrogen atom isn't a hydrogen atom, because
an atom is a physical thing. The mind, on the other hand, is immaterial --
it is a process, a function, and activity. Functions can (in theory) be
reproduced.
However, let me throw a bit of caution to the optimists. Uploading will
NOT be easy, or cheap; nor will uploads run millions of times faster that
biological humans for quite some time. How can I put this? The brain is
really, really big on a subcellular level. Early uploads will be crude,
slow, and require large national (or global) budgets to accomplish. And it
may not happen at all for another century or two. It's well worth pursuing,
but I wouldn't hold my breath (or my cryonics arrangements) waiting for it.
--
Joseph J. Strout Dept. of Neuroscience
Univ of CA, San Diego
--------------------------------------------------------
check out the Mind Uploading Home Page:
http://sunsite.unc.edu/jstrout/uploading/MUHomePage.html
Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=3663