X-Message-Number: 3864
Date: 17 Feb 95 17:29:11 EST
From: Saul Kent <>
Subject: Options

	I believe it is fruitful to look at the issue of whether it
will become possible to produce duplicates of human beings in the
following light. 
	Let's assume that it will become possible either to duplicate
us or to produce similar copies of us in the future. 	
	If we assume this, it presents us with certain options. 	
	For example, if I was alive and healthy and *certain* that a
duplicate of me could be produced, I would still argue if confronted
with such a duplicate, that it is *not* me. 
	However, if it proves *impossible* to restore me to life by
repairing my brain *after* I am frozen, but *is* possible to produce a
duplicate of me, or someone similar to me and, if that individual is
then *certain* he is me, and if everyone who knew me in the past agrees
with him, then the question of whether he *is* or is not me would not
be relevant. In such a circumstance, the question of whether I believed
(prior to being frozen) that such a person would or would not be me
would also be irrelevant. 
	If such a person is *uncertain* he is me and/or if others who
knew me in the past are uncertain he is me, it would be a significant
issue, but the question of whether I believed prior to being frozen
that such a person would or would not be me would still not necessarily
be relevant. 	
	I am raising these questions because I am working on a document
to provide guideliness for those who may be involved in attempts to
restore me to life after I have been frozen.  In formulating these
guidelines, I am assuming that it will be possible to make *many*
changes in me, including the possibility of producing a duplicate of
me.  My approach will be to request that they make every effort to
restore me to life (by repairing my brain) to the way I was when I was
in good health prior to being frozen *BEFORE* making ANY changes in me.
This will enable me to make my own decisions as to which changes I want
to see in myself *after* I have been restored to life.
	If it proves possible to restore me to life in my current state
of mind by repairing my brain, and if it also is possible to produce a
duplicate of me, I would not consider being *replaced* by such a dupli-
cate, although I might want to see one or more duplicates of me pro-
duced for other reasons.

Saul Kent




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