X-Message-Number: 4045 From: Date: Sun, 19 Mar 1995 12:51:20 -0500 Subject: SCI. CRYONICS chinese closet Thanks to John Clark (#4033) for the DNA portion of the posting, which I found useful. Thanks to Bruce Zimov (#4044) for the clarifications and refrerences on symbols. Thanks to Mr. Clark also (#4036) for his clear statement that he regards the Turing Test as reliable and necessary, and that only the Turing Test saves us from solipsism. Now let me try one more time to show that the Turing Test is HIGHLY unreliable and is most definitely NOT needed to save us from solipsism. The latter first. Mr. Clark has said before, and now again implied, that all I know about him I know through observation of his external behavior. This is a giant error. I know a great many generic things about him indirectly, through my general experience of the world and people. In particular, I have good reason to believe that his physiology is very similar to mine; now since I know I have feeling, and since not only his behavior but also his appearance and physiology are similar to mine, I have good reason to conclude that he has a subjective life also. If I were confronted with a black box, or a tin woodman, I would have reservations about imputing consciousness to them, regardless of the quality of their conversation. I wouldn't deny the possibility, but I would reserve judgment. If we have to go through these motions again, let's look once more at the Chinese Closet. THE CHINESE CLOSET: Everybody knows about John Searle's Chinese Room argument, so I won't repeat it here. Criticisms have been many, the most common one being that the Room as a whole DOES understand Chinese, even if the human operator doesn't. Analogies used are ant colonies, which some consider to exhibit intelligence even though individual ants are not intelligent, and the human brain, which is intelligent although the individual neurons are not. Saved by that good old catch-all, "emergence." But now let's look at the closet. My "Chinese Closet" is just a very small Chinese Room, with no human operator--only a relatively simple mechanism that passes out Chinese messages in exchange for English messages passed in. It can only handle a limited number of very simple messages, and if taxed beyond its capacity doesn't respond, or answers "Huh?" Rules: According to the usual Turing rules, the hidden program (if there is one) will do its best to simulate an honest and responsive person; and the real hidden person, if there is one, will do his best to be convincing as a person. We do NOT use this rule. Instead, we use a more realistic rule that would apply to unknown black boxes or visiting tin woodmen--namely, we can assume nothing about the nature or motives or intentions of the Closet. We must base our conclusions exclusively on the objective external evidence--the conversation the Closet produces or fails to produce. Now, what can a rational observer conclude about the intelligence and consciousness of the Closet? We can conclude that the Closet has at least enough "intelligence" to translate English into Chinese and then respond in English, with a very small repertory. We can conclude nothing whatever about the Closet's consciousness, because we KNOW its conversation could be reproduced by a relatively simple, unconscious piece of clockwork; and at the same time it MIGHT be conscious (have subjectivity)--and indeed it might be conscious even if it could not converse at all. Intelligence and feeling are ENTIRELY separate. We didn't really need the Closet; it should be obvious from the outset that robots (without subjectivity) MIGHT (in principle) function at a high enough effective level "intellectually" to fool any given observer; and that the presence or absence of feeling and consciousness can only be determined when we know their physical nature. Of course, when we know the physiology of feeling in mammals, that may still leave open the question of possible feeling in inorganic matter, but at least we will then have some clues. Until then, it is not warranted to ASSUME that consciousness can exist on an inorganic substrate, or that consciousness is nothing but symbol manipulation. Robert Ettinger Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=4045