X-Message-Number: 4131
From: 
Date: Sun, 2 Apr 1995 13:18:34 -0400
Subject: SCI. CRYONICS Liar

Peter Merel (#4119) implies that my (and Aristotle's) debunking of the Liar
"paradox" must be wrong because Bertrand Russell was smarter than I am, and
he took it seriously. Certainly Russell was smarter than I am; I'm not sure
if he was smarter than Aristotle. But smart is one thing; right is another.
He also mentions Goedel, about whom I'll go into detail another time.

John Clark (#4121) says Russell and I are both wrong because Goedel did
better.  He also  says I am talking about Russell's Theory of Types; I am
not. I am talking about meaningfulness, and I suggest a simple (and far from
original) criterion:

I suggest that a statement is meaningful only if IN PRINCIPLE it can be
tested or verified. However, this "simple" criterion needs a good deal of
examination.

One immediate objection will be a counterexample such as: "All unicorns are
white." This appears at first glance to be meaningful but not verifiable.
Such are the traps and subtleties of language. Actually, the statement IS
verifiable--to the extent that it is meaningful.  
Unicorns are mythical creatures, and their attributes are whatever the myth
says or implies. Unicorns "are" white if those who subscribe to the myth
believe it, and this belief can in principle be verified. In any event, we
can deal with the situation, using either Aristotelean or fuzzy logic. From
the Aristotelean perspective, the answer is simple: since "believers" come in
all shades, many with no opinion on the color of unicorns, or with contrary
opinions, the statement is false.

Another proffered counterexample--the detailed characterization of a system
in the distant past. Quantum uncertainties supposedly rule out detailed
inferences over long time periods, even given maximum present information. If
we accept the assumptions, this is not a counterexample, just an example of a
meaningless statement.

This does not exhaust the possibilities, of course, but as far as I know
there is no example of a statement that "should" be regarded as clearly
meaningful, yet is clearly unverifiable in principle. Perhaps a reader will
supply his favorite example (not counting Goedelian "examples").

Robert Ettinger

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