X-Message-Number: 4944 From: Peter Merel <> Subject: SCI.CRYONICS A Refutation of Memetics? Date: Fri, 6 Oct 1995 17:15:49 +1000 (EST) Once upon a time, when this list was very young, Keith Henson explained memetics to me. I promised that I'd reply to him and explain my misgivings about the idea, but as I was still trying to get a grip on a philosophy that I could prefer at that time, I never got around to doing so. Now quite a few years have passed, but I recently had occasion to think about memetics again, and to describe my objections to it in a concrete form. Since this list still concerns itself with memetic matters on occasion, especially when one particularly noisy correspondent comes up with hare-brained marketing ideas (me, silly), I hope that this subject will still be deemed relevant. -- It seems plain that the meaning of any information depends upon the context within which it is considered. This is to say that meaning is fleeting, relative and inherent to the action of intelligence, rather than constituting some necessary and absolute attribute of each piece of information. Memes, therefore, can not be held to exist consistently across their hosts. Information patterns can not code for any particular meaning or interpretation, and so one host's internal representation of a meme need not coincide in any particular with the internal representation of that meme in another host. It seems plain therefore that memes are not inherent attributes of pieces of information, but that they are particular instances of information; memes can be considered as the patterns of information that are replicated by their hosts, but not as any internal representation of those patterns within a host. This definition suggests that internal representations or meanings might be thought of as serving as "phenotypes" to a purely external meme's "genotype". This still would appear to constitute a concrete definition. However, when we observe that one piece of information is replicated by another, this is only to say is that, from our own preferred context, one piece of information is similar to another. Since there is no absolute context within which meaning can be determined, such an identity can only be a value judgement on the part of a memeticist. Memes, therefore, can not be demonstrated to exist except within the mind of a memeticist. If this is the case, then it seems that memetics is only a method of rationalization whereby "hosts" and "memes" are dismissed in terms of value judgements. And if that is the case, then memetics does not actually pertain to the analysis of psychology or social dynamics, but only serves to highlight internal distinctions and biases within its adherents. Memetics might then be viewed with the same distaste that we apply to racism. Its terminology, though couched in pseudo-clinical language, is quite ugly and derogatory. The memeticist dismisses people of differing cultures, religions and politics as "bots" or "oids" or "infected" or one of a dozen other disdainful eptithets. Memetics treats competing philosophies in obstructionist terms, as memes that "immunise" their hosts against "The Meta-Meme" or ultimate truth of memetics, or as "toxic" information that endangers its hosts and/or other people. This sort of obstructionist dogma is similar to the terms favoured by cults, and this suggest to me that memetics might itself support cult-style activities among some of its adherents. For that reason I fear that some readers might view this article with acrimony, since it challenges attitudes that some may regard as being sacrosanct. If that occurs then I can only point out that my purpose is not to cause anyone any anguish, but only to contribute my opinion, so any flames that result will be cheerfully ignored. All rational responses will be well appreciated. -- Internet: | Accept Everything. | http://www.usyd.edu.au/~pete/ | Reject Nothing. | Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=4944