X-Message-Number: 4944
From: Peter Merel <>
Subject: SCI.CRYONICS A Refutation of Memetics?
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 1995 17:15:49 +1000 (EST)

Once upon a time, when this list was very young, Keith Henson explained 
memetics to me. I promised that I'd reply to him and explain my misgivings
about the idea, but as I was still trying to get a grip on a philosophy
that I could prefer at that time, I never got around to doing so. 

Now quite a few years have passed, but I recently had occasion to
think about memetics again, and to describe my objections to it in a
concrete form. Since this list still concerns itself with memetic matters
on occasion, especially when one particularly noisy correspondent comes up
with hare-brained marketing ideas (me, silly), I hope that this subject 
will still be deemed relevant. 

--

It seems plain that the meaning of any information depends upon the
context within which it is considered. This is to say that meaning is
fleeting, relative and inherent to the action of intelligence, rather
than constituting some necessary and absolute attribute of each piece
of information.

Memes, therefore, can not be held to exist consistently across their
hosts. Information patterns can not code for any particular meaning or
interpretation, and so one host's internal representation of a meme
need not coincide in any particular with the internal representation 
of that meme in another host.

It seems plain therefore that memes are not inherent attributes of
pieces of information, but that they are particular instances of
information; memes can be considered as the patterns of information
that are replicated by their hosts, but not as any internal
representation of those patterns within a host. This definition
suggests that internal representations or meanings might be thought
of as serving as "phenotypes" to a purely external meme's "genotype".

This still would appear to constitute a concrete definition. However,
when we observe that one piece of information is replicated by another,
this is only to say is that, from our own preferred context, one piece
of information is similar to another. Since there is no absolute
context within which meaning can be determined, such an identity can 
only be a value judgement on the part of a memeticist.

Memes, therefore, can not be demonstrated to exist except within the
mind of a memeticist. If this is the case, then it seems that memetics
is only a method of rationalization whereby "hosts" and "memes" are
dismissed in terms of value judgements. And if that is the case, then
memetics does not actually pertain to the analysis of psychology or
social dynamics, but only serves to highlight internal distinctions
and biases within its adherents.

Memetics might then be viewed with the same distaste that we apply to
racism. Its terminology, though couched in pseudo-clinical language, is
quite ugly and derogatory. The memeticist dismisses people of differing
cultures, religions and politics as "bots" or "oids" or "infected" or
one of a dozen other disdainful eptithets.  Memetics treats competing
philosophies in obstructionist terms, as memes that "immunise" their
hosts against "The Meta-Meme" or ultimate truth of memetics, or as
"toxic" information that endangers its hosts and/or other people.  

This sort of obstructionist dogma is similar to the terms favoured by
cults, and this suggest to me that memetics might itself support
cult-style activities among some of its adherents.  For that reason I
fear that some readers might view this article with acrimony, since it
challenges attitudes that some may regard as being sacrosanct. If
that occurs then I can only point out that my purpose is not to cause
anyone any anguish, but only to contribute my opinion, so any flames
that result will be cheerfully ignored. All rational responses will be 
well appreciated.

--

Internet:           |         Accept Everything.            |

http://www.usyd.edu.au/~pete/          |         Reject Nothing.               |


Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=4944