X-Message-Number: 7185
Date: 21 Nov 96 08:15:06 EST
From: "Steven B. Harris" <>
Subject: Philosophy of Science
In Message #7157 (Mon, 18 Nov 1996 14:06)
R.W. Ettinger () writes:
>>1. Steve offers a "definition" of the "scientific method"
which is juvenile, and which leads him to exclude certain areas
of life and thought from "science." Actually, NO area of life or
thought need be excluded from the "scientific method", or should
be.<<
Comment: I find Ettinger's language here and elsewhere
especially unfortunate. While it's true that at age 39 I'm a
somewhat younger man than Dr. Ettinger at 78, this in itself is
not germane, unless ad hominem is the object. Thus I'll suggest
a compromise: if Ettinger will agree in future to avoid the word
"juvenile" in regard to my thinking on matters scientific, I'll
agree to avoid the word "senile" in regard to his.
Apart from the attempt at condescension, Dr. Ettinger's
argument here seems to be partly semantic and partly
philosophical. The semantic part, like all semantic arguments,
is an argument over what a term like "scientific method" MEANS in
everyday use by the community who use it (laymen, scientists, or
philosophers of science). As to this, I can only comment that
I'm well aware of how the phrase "scientific method" is used in
the community of scientists, and in this I plead guilty only to
using pretty much standard English, which Ettinger seems to
dislike in this case (let him write letters to makers of
dictionaries and encyclopedias). As to how the working scienti-
fic community thinks about the scientific method in use, I can
report as a working scientist that it seems to be very much the
same way I do. My last paper, for instance, after extensive peer
review, was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, and I take this as evidence that a fair number of
people in the scientific community (including a member of the
National Academy who sponsored the paper) did not feel that this
public example of my own practice of the scientific method had
let the community of science down in some way. On the contrary.
As for the community of people who write about the philosophy
of science, I too have a shelf of books by philosophers of
science, from Tarski to Popper to Putnam. In none of them have I
found evidence that Ettinger is (as he claims) one of some tiny
minority of people who understands the foundations of the
scientific method. I can only suggest here again that people
with as little humility as Ettinger admits to in this regard,
ought to have a longer relevant curriculum vitae.
As for Ettinger's _philosophical_ comments on the application
and scope of the term "science" (the scientific method), I can
only argue his definition on utilitarian grounds. If I
understand Ettinger correctly, I believe his proposal that
"science" should be defined so as not be excluded from any area
of life, is not very useful. The problem here is that Ettinger
would define "science" in a way which does not recognize an
important natural dichotomy in human thought-- one which the term
itself was invented in order to highlight. Clearly, as we gaze
about the world of human culture, there are some areas of
knowledge-seeking about the universe in which progress is being
made, and all agree that it is being made (chemistry, engineeri-
ng, physics, etc). There are other areas, however, in which
progress is not so obviously being made, and these include the
traditional areas of religion and philosophy (ethics, aesthetics,
metaphysics) where arguments do not progress toward consensus
with time, and in which (unlike the case in, say, physics)
holders of minority opinions do NOT agree to change their minds
if certain public experiments and observations, which have not
yet been done, eventually show one thing verses another. In such
areas there is no use talking about the search for facts about
the external universe, because nobody can agree as to what the
facts are, or even about how to go about finding them.
Again, our word "science" (short for the older and synonymous
term "natural science" preceding it) was originally constructed
to differentiate these two broad areas of epistemology. The word
"science" (Greek) originally simply meant practical knowledge (as
in political science or carpentry science). However, the word as
we use it now refers to "natural science," which in turn refers
to the body of knowledge, and the method used to find it, which
comprises publically demonstrable facts and predictive theories
about nature. (Natural) science knowledge is differentiable from
certain kinds of private experiential knowledge or ethical
belief, which themselves are (unlike scientific observations and
theories) not available for use in any kind of process of
consensus-building toward a shared idea of truth about the
external world. This is what makes "science" different.
Again, the process by which knowledge of nature is gained by
means of publically verified experimentation, is what I have
called the "scientific method" in the preceding discussions. For
this process to work, a certain quantitative process of quality
control must operate, as I said. If Ettinger wishes to argue
that we shouldn't be using the term in this way (as we do), he is
free to argue this. But again, such a program for re-definition
of the word "science" is not likely to be helpful. It does
little good, for instance, for Ettinger to say that scientists
rely on hearsay, faith, and indirect evidence, just like everyb-
ody else (astrologers, iridologists, and preachers, I suppose),
for obviously scientists do hold standards of evidence which are
qualitatively and quantitatively different that those of many
other philosophical or artistic undertakings, allowing the
conclusions of scientists to have a special character which (at
least partly) transcends culture and ideology. Specifically, if
knowledge and power go together, and presence of knowledge of
nature implies human power over nature, it is reasonable to
conclude that the presence of human power over nature implies
conversely the presence of real knowledge about nature (how else
do we identify "knowledge" in a way which invites agreement by
all?). Since the power of science cannot be denied by sane and
honest persons (look at a rocket or a computer), the knowledge
brought by scientific methods cannot be denied either (you can't
get to the moon without knowing how). Our task, if we are sane
and honest, then, is to identify just what factors *make*
scientific knowledge and the method which leads to it uniquely
powerful (therefore "true").
As Paul Wakfer notes, Ettinger's definition for the scientific
method (honesty and resourcefulness) completely ignores the
rather short history of application of the scientific method as
we know it, and the relatively recent technical revolution which
that unique process has spawned. What, did people suddenly
become more honest and resourceful, beginning in the 17th
century? Ettinger's definition is vague and incomplete, missing
the real meat of the new ideas which comprise the scientific
method. Ettinger might perhaps understand this himself if he
considered that "honesty and resourcefulness," the two qualities
he named as the fundamentals of the scientific method, do not by
themselves imply anything at all about use of probability theory,
which he later claims is the foundation of science.
Here's the problem: It isn't enough to be honest and resourc-
eful to do science, for honest and resourceful people still often
see what they expect to, and they still make mistakes in quantity
and quality in their observations. Without proper training,
honest and resourceful people flounder about like Aristotle and
the ancient Greeks when it came to physics and astronomy.
Furthermore, there are (to pick a modern example) plenty of
people who think God answers their prayers, or that an astrologer
has predicted their futures. It is wholly insulting and wrong to
consider such people simply dishonest. Nor are humans naturally
good judges of probability in many circumstances (see Las Vegas),
and this has nothing to do with honesty either (again, it's a
methodological training issue).
The quintessentially public character of what we generally
call scientific pursuits, arises from the fact that the scienti-
fic method demands checking of observations by more than one
person, and/or blinding of observational trials so that people do
not fool themselves with their own expectations, with regard to
what they "observe." Because of natural human failings in the
use of quantitative experience, the doing of science also often
requires formal statistical methods in order to accurately judge
probabilities. All of this is implicit in the definition of
scientific method as objective quality control loop, which I
earlier gave. Nowhere is it to be found in anything Ettinger has
put forward.
Ettinger continues:
>>One of the most simplistic definitions (and one somewhat
similar to Steve's) is that of Lord Kelvin, who said, "...when
you can measure what you are speaking about...you know something
about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers...you have
scarcely advanced to the stage of Science..." The fact
is that, while a scientist certainly prefers quantitative
measures and precise definitions, he cannot always get them. The
scientist is not too proud to use rough approximations when
necessary, and in lieu of a clear idea he will go as far as he
can with a vague one.<<
But I would here point out that because a scientist has a
vague idea, that does not make the vague idea science.
Scientific ideas must be publically testable, which means they
must be clearly predictive. Ideas about truth which are not
publically testable or publically predictive (ex: "Jesus loves
me," "That's an ugly wallpaper," "Abortion is wrong.") are not
science (except possibly to Ettinger). Further, I will assert
that ideas which are so vague as to really say nothing ("Only the
fittest animals survive") are not science either. At best such
ideas are useful in that they can be made into science with the
addition of some quantification and statistics. But then, of
course, they are not so vague.
Ettinger:
>>Is a choice of paintings "scientific?" Could be, if it
results from a reasonably clear set of criteria--or even if it
results just from a reasonable decision just to go with one's
feelings. In all cases, what counts is an examination--as careful
as the stakes warrant--of one's goals and the likelihood of
reaching them by various routes.<<
Comment: I submit that it is a flat-out perversion of the
language to suggest that such a process has anything to do with
the scientific method.
Enough for tonight. I'll address some of Ettinger's more
specific comments in a later message.
Steve Harris
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