X-Message-Number: 7945 From: Peter Merel <> Subject: Be Vewy Vewy Quiet ... Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 22:25:54 +1000 (EST) Robert Ettinger writes, >Peter asks the difference between "raw sensory data"and"qualia." O.K.: A raw >sensory datum is an electrochemical signal sent e.g. from the retina of the >eye to the visual cortex; the secondary datum (oversimplifying a bit) would >be the signal from the visual cortex to some other part of the brain (perhaps >a more primitive part) containing the "self circuit" or the >anatomical/physiological feature that constitutes the seat of feeling (and >hence the ground of being); ensuing modifications to the self circuit, or >modulations of the self circuit, constitute the quale. I've already stipulated this: qualia, if they are distinct from the usual run of neural events, may indeed be implemented by your self-circuit. But my question concerns the definition of qualia, not their implementation. I think, let us understand what these beasts are, and then maybe we'll find a way to track them to their lair. >Probably Peter and others will as usual ask, why introduce this unnecessary >complication, the self circuit? Why can't the processed sensory data >themselves constitute the qualia? The answer is that we have every reason to >recognize a profound, qualitative distinction between the subjective >condition and other phenomena of nature, demanding a special physical system. I'm sure you'll recognise that a definition of the distinction between sense data and qualia as "qualitative" smacks of a certain circularity ... But you speak of "every reason to recognise" qualia. It would be most helpful if you could list some of your reasons - even just one or two would be a good start. >Certainly there are many who think consciousness will "just grow," like Topsy >(or like Hal in the movie), if the computer becomes complicated enough. Some >have even attempted to offer some detail--e.g. Daniel Dennett in his book of >a few years back, ludicrously entitled CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED. I'm not one of them. I suspect that consciousness is only a value judgement, just as per Turing; in fact I'm tempted to put life down to a value judgement too: tell me that fire is not alive, and I'll show you the Banksias opening after a bushfire. But these are only my suspicions. I'm open minded on such things, and most curious about them. >I don't think computers will "just grow" into consciousness any more than you >can make a bicycle out of manure just by piling it high enough. Wait, let me get my mold! :-) Peter Merel. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=7945