X-Message-Number: 8015
From: 
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 1997 20:00:25 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Experiment vs. definition

Mike Perry (#8009-8013) says certain things that seem somewhat inconsistent
to me. 

In #8009 he says we can experiment to locate the seat of feeling, and
mentions the conjecture that it is in the midbrain-thalamic reticular
formation. But then in #8010 the thrust of his discussion is that
consciousness may be a matter of degree, and that a dim level of
consciousness might be ascribed to simple, goal-seeking automata such as Grey
Walter's turtles. 

These two notions do not fit well together. If the mammalian brain has a
definite seat of feeling--whether localized or distributed in the brain or
its functions--then the rest of the brain and its functions (most of it) is
presumably outside of feeling, or more or less independent of it. And if most
of the human brain is unfeeling, then surely we have no reason to ascribe
feeling to a simple automaton.

If you claim that almost any kind of information processing is
"consciousness" of some kind or in some degree, then you have simply made
"information processing" the definition of consciousness. This is totally at
odds with common sense, and in any case useless since it leaves no room for
experimental verification. 

As for survival criteria, I'll be interested to see Dr. Perry's full
exposition; but so far I see no way to resolve the problems with ANY proposed
criteria--unless we simply go with a hunch or a personal preference, which I
am not willing to do. And with our present limited (almost zero) knowledge of
time, among other things, it seems to me premature and unnecessary to make a
decision.

Robert Ettinger

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