X-Message-Number: 8180 Subject: Simulations again Date: Mon, 05 May 1997 12:51:37 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <> > From: > > 1. Metzger had asked me repeatedly to admit I couldn't prove my body is not > in a vat being fed virtual reality. I answered that I had clearly all along > agreed, for purposes of discussion, that we all might be living in a > simulation. This OBVIOUSLY included, as a less far-fetched case, the > possibility he mentions, that I am real but the outside world I think I > experience is virtual. Nevertheless, he again complains (#8166) that he is > talking about the vat problem, not the full sim problem. > > Aside from his failure to see the obvious, what is his point? If I can't > prove I'm not in a vat, so what? *How does this bear on anything at issue?* Well, this entire argument was caused by you contending, over and over again, that someone couldn't live out their life inside a simulation. However, you now are saying that the fact that you might be in a simulation right now has no bearing on this issue. I believe a slight contradiction might be here? > a. "If you don't believe one machine can efficiently simulate another....go > buy SoftWindows..." > > I never said one machine cannot efficiently simulate another; I said one > machine can't sustain, relative to demand, an infinite cascade of simulations > and subsimulations etc. Except that your argument is utterly wrong, as I will show below... > b. Metzger: [The subsim-cascade-freeze wouldn't happen because] "...if we are > dealing with a sufficiently detailed simulation, the simulation wouldn't care > if it's simulating a waterfall or a microprocessor." > > The "simulation" is a whole virtual world. The simulated computer(s) in it > behave very differently in certain respects, depending on whether or not they > generate sub-simulations and further sub-subs ad infinitum. No, they do not. Lets say (for purposes of discussion) we are simulating a world down to the subatomic level. Such a simulation does not care, in any way, whether it is simulating a waterfall, an explosion, or a computer. In all, we have complex interactions of atoms, but beyond that, the computer need not have any sense at all of what it is that it is simulating. You appear to be suffering from the delusion that gripped the philosopher Zeno, who contenteded motion was impossible since every motion necessarily involved the sum of an infinite series of motions. Yes, you are correct, that every simulation could have a smaller subsimulation in it. However, you seem to be ignorant of basic math. Zeno's paradox doesn't stop motion, and simulations inside simulations don't create an "increasing load". > The latter case imposes a RAPIDLY INCREASING LOAD and one WITHOUT > BOUND on any level of computers, That is false. Even if you have an infinite number of subsimulations, the total amount of computation being done by the system is bounded, because the sum of any geometric decreasing series is finite. Even a first year math student could tell you that. Of course, this should be plain and obvious from the fact that the computer doing the outside simulation won't even be aware of what is going on in the "inside" simulations. As I've mentioned in the past, I can take the "psim" program -- a real program for simulating PowerPC based computers -- and run "psim" on it. The outside "psim" has no knowledge of the fact that the inside machine is running "psim" and does not care. The very innermost "psim" could also start "psim" and the outer machine will still not care. Anyone who works with computers would understand this intuitively, of course. You keep speaking, with what I can only call sheer idiocy, of "load", as though computers only work so hard if asked particular problems but work much "harder" if you ask them other problems and might even "melt" if you stress them too much. All computers, of course, run flat out as fast as they can AT ALL TIMES. They don't "exert themselves" when they are running something "strenuous". They execute an instruction at every clock tick, regardless of whether or not they "have something to do". The first copy of "psim" running on the machine will be running at the same speed, regardless of how many subcopies of "psim" are running inside "psims" within it. It does not "slow down". The outer machine never notices "increasing load". All such claims are the result of Mr. Ettinger having no experience with actual, real, functioning systems -- systems that by his logic should not exist (although they do). > c. "...you can't build an infinite number of computers in the universe around > you..." > > Not germane. Completely germane. Just because you dismiss things with a handwave doesn't make them irrelevant. You claim it is a flaw of the simulation that it cannot sustain an infinite amount of computation. However, THE UNIVERSE CAN'T, EITHER. Why, then, do you say the simulation is somehow "flawed" for being unable to do something the unverse cannot? > e. [I said the postulated situation would result in zillions of subsimulated > worlds.] > > Metzger: "There isn't space on the planet...for zillions of computers, so why > should a simulation be defective if it doesn't simulate a large enough > universe for 'zillions' of computers?" > > Missed the bull's eye, the target, and the side of the barn. I didn't say > anything about "defective" simulations. I said the postulated situation would > demand a cascade of subsimulations, and the real or first-level computer > couldn't keep up with the demand (nor could any of the sublevel computers). See "psim". If I can do what you claim cannot be done RIGHT NOW, the obvious and complete stupidity of your claim becomes obvious to all. I am currently running five nested copies of PSIM on the machine I am typing this on. The outer machine is not "grinding to a halt". It is not "spewing smoke". I never noticed any change in the speed of the outer computer no matter what I did to the inner computer, which of course is what you would expect. I could run a sixth level inside the fifth, if I chose, or a seventh, or an eighth. You claim that this cannot be done, of course, because you are ignorant and refuse to admit it. Can you explain, Mr. Ettinger, in your expertise about computers (which you seem to know so much about!) why it is that the outer machine isn't "grinding to a halt"? Since you know so much about how computers work, perhaps you could tell me why it is that what you know isn't so. > f. [I previously said that someone who seriously entertained the material > probability that he is living in a simulation ought to be "praying"to his > programmer. Metzger asked "Why?" I said this ought to be obvious.] > > Metzger: "...not obvious to the rest of us." > > I'm not sure what makes him think he can speak for everybody else on the > list, but if it really has to be spelled out I'll spell it out: > > If I think there is a serious possibility that I am a simulation, > then I must realize that the programmer is capable of knowing what I > do and even think, since all of that can be displayed to him. He > also has the ability, from my point of view, to work miracles-- > change history, change my person and environment, even change the > laws of nature (rules of the program). Therefore, by persuasion or > entreaty, I might be able to invoke his powers to my benefit. This > is "prayer." Given that you know nothing about the programmer -- that for all you know he might find your stupidity in claiming that he might be influenced by prayer to be offensive, and might grant you "bad luck" as a reward -- and given that you don't even know if there even is a programmer or the nature of one if there is -- is it not utterly foolish and idiotic to begin creating a religion around one? > Metzger goes on to say it would be silly for simulations to pray in this > manner, because the programmer wouldn't be listening and isn't omniscient. And further... 1) Might not care, or even 2) Might for whatever reason be actively hostile to those praying > As for "Am I in a vat?"--this also might, in some circumstances, be amenable > to investigation by the subject. For example, if I suspect a certain enemy > has done this to me, then my body is in some specific location, and I can try > to find it. Depending on the nature of the VR feed, I do have some > interaction with the outside world, Where would you get that idea? You have no interaction with the outside world, Mr. Ettinger. You are a brain in a vat, hooked up to a simulation. > and if this is close enough to normal I might even find my body, > using my virtual senses. Your virtual senses are hooked up to a virtual universe, not the real one. You are mistaking levels. However, as I've said, none of this matters. You have already conceeded the entire argument, as I will note again: > 1. Metzger had asked me repeatedly to admit I couldn't prove my body is not > in a vat being fed virtual reality. I answered that I had clearly all along > agreed, for purposes of discussion, that we all might be living in a > simulation. This OBVIOUSLY included, as a less far-fetched case, the > possibility he mentions, that I am real but the outside world I think I > experience is virtual. Nevertheless, he again complains (#8166) that he is > talking about the vat problem, not the full sim problem. > > Aside from his failure to see the obvious, what is his point? If I can't > prove I'm not in a vat, so what? *How does this bear on anything at issue?* This entire argument was caused by you contending, over and over again, that someone couldn't live out their life inside a simulation. However, you now are saying that the fact that you might be in a simulation right now has no bearing on this issue. To me, however, you have now conceeded the entire argument: you have admitted that you might very well be living your life out in a simulation, which is a complete admition that you were wrong and that someone COULD live their life out inside a simulation. 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