X-Message-Number: 8542
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 1997 14:55:20 -0400
From: "John P. Pietrzak" <>
Subject: Re: Yet more Turing
References: <>

Peter Merel writes:
>John Pietrzak writes,

>> you'll find yourself restricted in
>> the same way that a classic Turing Machine is restricted: your
>> machine may be faster, but it _can't do anything new_.

> Let's have a TM of a speed and program adequate to simulate in 
> realtime the quantum function of our universe; [etc.]
[The counter-example being a fast machine doing things before I do.]

Obviously, I've phrased this wrong.  What I'm trying to say is, no
matter what type of new, fancy processor you come up with, if it is
Turing Machine equivalent, then it can do anything a Turing Machine
can do, and it can't do anything a Turing Machine can't do.  All
modern digital processors are Turing equivalent.  Unless some radical
change in technology occurs, all future digital processors will also
be Turing equivalent.  I.E., they will do nothing _new_ that a
Turing Machine couldn't do.

[Peter drags out the real, verbatim Turing Test:]
> "The``imitation game'' is played with three people, a man (A), a
> woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The
> object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of
> the other two is the man and which is the woman. The interrogator
> is allowed to put questions to A and B. The ideal arrangement is
> to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms." 
>
> "We now ask the question ``What will happen when a machine takes
> the part of A in this game?'' Will the interrogator decide wrongly
> as often as when the game is played between a man and a woman?
> These questions replace our original, ``Can machines think?''"

(Some people, remarking upon Turing's sexual orientation and somewhat
mysogynistic (sp?) tendencies, say that this may have been in part
a joke: "Can women think?")

> There are three salient differences between Turing's definition and
> your interpretation:
>
> + a teleprinter is only "ideal" - the test can be conducted by
> examining any behaviour, not just talking.

But then, Turing was describing this test in the context of the
computer hardware of his day.  (For example, if you could examine
the man, woman, and computer physically, there should be certain
aspects of their physiology which would allow you easily to tell
one from the other. ;) )

> + the test does not suggest that imitative behaviour qualifies as 
> intelligence; it proposes instead that the ascription of intelligence 
> can be nothing more than a value judgement.

This is the most damning aspect of the test: that the results are
purely subjective in nature.  In other words, the test means whatever
you want it to mean.  By choosing an appropriate interrogator, you
can get whatever results you like.

> + the test never ascribes intelligence with any certainty - it only
> addresses the frequency with which the computer, in the judgement of
> its interrogator, can pass as human. This is a probabilistic test.
> As such, given an adequate sample size of subjects and interrogators
> your objections about language, human speciesism (a word?) and 
> willingness are moot.

Given an adequate supply of interrogators, the entire test is moot.
The entire burden of identification lies upon the interrogators;
therefore, unless the definition of womanhood/humanhood/intelligence
is defined appropriately inside the interrogator already, results
will be little different than random chance.


John

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