X-Message-Number: 9117
From: 
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 1998 10:54:46 EST
Subject: One more time

Hopefully my last "probability" post for a while. Some points, responses,
etc.:

1. Several people have requested my free booklet, "Cryonics: The Probability
of Rescue." They will receive their copies by mail from the Immortalist
Society, as will those who subsequently request it. 

2. At risk of appearing testy again, those who dismiss my approach to
probability theory are butting their heads against FACTS, not just my
opinions. 

My approach to probability is not just speculation nor playing with
terminology: it is TESTABLE and TESTED; it is PROVEN; it WORKS, and works
BETTER than the standard approach. 

Those who have my booklet can look, for one thing, at the specific technical
example near the end, concerning the exponential life parameter. It is proven
correct, not only by the agreement of experts in the field--professors of
statistics at Wayne State U. and elsewhere--but also, more importantly, it is
there in plain view for the reader to verify for himself. It WORKS, and works
BETTER than the standard approach. If used commercially, it saves time and
money. FACT, not just vague philosophizing.

My broader claim is that my approach is better than the standard approach in
ALL cases where they disagree. (Further, my approach is applicable in many
cases where the standard approach says "Probability is not applicable here.")
Again, this is not just talk, but TESTABLE. If someone doesn't believe me, TRY
IT. If you don't know how to apply it to a specific problem, I'll try to find
time to help you, if you wish.

In fact, my approach is not only testable, but in all instances of application
has ALREADY been tested, which is precisely the reason for using it. For
instance, consider my football example. (The von Mises school says sporting
events are outside the purview of probability theory--try telling that to the
odds makers in Vegas!) I don't know if the Associated Press still publishes a
weekly poll of sports writers handicapping the upcoming games, but let's
assume they do. 

Our bettor A from Alabama is not familiar with Michigan teams, but (say) knows
that the AP poll has picked Michigan State over Wayne State, and that the poll
has a long track record of being right about 70% of the time. He therefore
bets on Michigan State (I disregard questions of available odds), on the
premise that the probability of a victory by MSU is about 0.7. Although the
data base is relatively small and the conditions somewhat
changeable--compared, say, to coin tossing--still this is a perfectly valid
application of probability theory. It's a bit rough, but IT WORKS, and no
amount of argument or opinion will change that. Likewise, my other bettors,
with different stores of information, will come up with different
probabilities (based on different sequences of experiments)--and these are
also valid, also verifiable and verified.

In short, my approach may not suit everyone's taste, and its application is
not always easy, and in some cases it may produce numbers too imprecise to be
very useful--but it is VALID beyond challenge. It is testable and tested, and
it enlarges the useful domain of probability theory. Once more: read the
booklet!

3. Charles Platt (#9105) says discussions of probability constitute merely a
"distraction" from the real work that needs to be done. This sounds a bit
strange, from one who has spent a lot of time trying (with some success) to
devise better public relations. Our "real work" has many facets, and some of
our prospective members do in fact regard the probability of adequate future
technology as important. Certainly many prospective recruits have been turned
off by "authoritative" statements by cryobiologists about the "negligible"
probability of success. 

4. Will Dye and others have asked for the citation on Gallup. I probably have
it somewhere, but I can't promise to find it any time soon. Maybe someone else
can locate it.

5. Thomas Donaldson says I have merely "systematized intuition." No. I have
provided an explicit method of arriving at probability estimates, which in
some cases serves to reinforce intuition, or which in some cases is initially
suggested by intuition. Again, IT WORKS. It is PROVEN.

Thomas also says that he dislikes intuition, which is variable. Again, even
though my approach may in some cases produce a result initially suggested by
intuition, the actual application requires an explicit reference to a
reasonably well specified series of experiments. There is nothing vague about
it, even though the numbers produced may sometimes have more margin for error
than one might prefer. A ROUGH NUMBER IS BETTER THAN NO NUMBER.

6. Fred Chamberlain's fable (#9111) illustrates well the nuances of psychology
and the skills of leadership. At its core it just says what we have all said
over and over, that some chance is better than none and action is better than
passive acceptance of doom--but it says it in a way that sometimes works
better than a less colorful statement. 

7. Saul Kent (#9110) says that later this year 21 CM may be in a position to
say more about its research program and possible availability for investment.
Good.

8. Paul Wakfer (#9114) makes several statements that seem off the mark to me:

a) He says or implies  that injection or improvement or repair of memories in
the brain of patient, with information from external sources, would not result
in "really" the same person with "real" memories.  Why not? Such work will not
be done until the mechanism of memory is thoroughly understood, and until the
repair can be integrated with the whole persona. Repair with fidelity is a
tall order from a 20th Century standpoint, but far from impossible.

b) He repeats an argument to the effect that we can't make valid probability
statements about things we don't understand. And I repeat that, on the
contrary, we do it all the time. Nobody understands the
psychological/physiological/sociological functions that determine the outcome
of a football game, but the odds-makers in Vegas do all right.  Of course, it
DOES help to know more; with more and better information, we can refer to a
more appropriate series of experiments and get an estimate in which we can
have more confidence. Nevertheless, an estimate of broad sweep is MUCH better
than nothing.

More information can also hinder, rather than help, if used inappropriately. A
"naïve" layman may say to himself: "Looking at the sweep of history and the
acceleration of science, and the many successes and partial successes in
reviving frozen specimens, it seems likely the repair problem will be solved."
A "sophisticated" cryobiologist may say, "The damage is irreversible and the
cadaver has no chance of revival." The layman's handle on probability is
better than the cryobiologist's. And while that layman's statement may be
regarded as "mere" intuition, one COULD find an explicit sequence of
experiments to which to tie it.

c) Paul seems to suggest that life for an amnesiac would not be worth living.
I don't recall any statistics about amnesiacs being overwhelmingly
suicidal--even if we were to agree that the amnesia could not be fixed.

d) Paul points out that pessimists--or people who are pessimistic in certain
areas--can nevertheless be supporters of cryonics. Of course, and we are glad
to have them aboard. But it remains an extremely simple and obvious fact of
psychology and public relations that broadcasting pessimism doesn't help
recruitment. When the pessimism is unjustified, the blunder is even worse. We
don't want to be unscrupulous spin doctors like the politicians, but optimism
works better than pessimism--even in encouraging research donations.

Finally, certain information circulating unofficially suggests that PpP may
have better prospects than I thought. That is encouraging, and more support
may develop.

Robert Ettinger
Cryonics Institute
Immortalist Society
http://www.cryonics.org

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