X-Message-Number: 9205 Date: Wed, 25 Feb 98 18:06:36 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Re: CryoNet #9201 Bob Ettinger writes > > With all due respect to Mike Perry (and he is due a lot), his # 9195 seems to > me to be very much over-simplified. > > He seems to be saying, more or less, that memory or memories should be > regarded as essential to survival. But this sort of criterion is at least as > vulnerable as others to questions of accuracy, duplication, fidelity, > continuity, etc. > Well, I didn't say that questions couldn't be raised. So here goes. > For one thing, suppose (as in the movie TOTAL RECALL) that false memories are > somehow substituted for your real ones. The protagonist in the movie says, "If > I'm not me, then who the hell am I?" If memory MAKES or defines the > individual, then the protagonist was indeed "me"--meaning the person > identified by those false memories. In other words, the memories were "false" > only by the historical criterion, and everyone knows history is bunk. > This is one issue I address at some length in my book, *Forever for All*. I don't say "history is bunk." But I do accept some version of parallel worlds (not necessarily the famous many-worlds theory of Everett; I am less specific in the requirements, but maintain that some version is likely to hold, and I lean toward Everett's). There is a chapter of my book devoted to this too. The upshot is that all possible histories, over large limits, are real. Crazy as it may seem, there aren't really any truly "false" memories, barring such problems as logically contradictory memories. I allow that, in extreme cases, a person might be what I call "xenontic," literally a traveler from some other universe whose history is different from ours, as defined by the memories they have, i.e. their memories could be contrary to the facts of our history. They would presumably have some adjustment problems, and I don't recommend arbitrary tinkering with one's memories (which is possible today, in a limited way, but ought to be more feasible in the future) to create such an alternate self. > Certainly the example above is itself oversimplified; Mike did not say, and > probably no one believes, that memory is the SOLE criterion of identity or > survival. But if it is the main one, or even a necessary one, the problem > alluded to exists. > > Another example of a problem shared by the memory criterion: Suppose "you" are > thawed out and repaired, or reconstituted, or duplicated, or whatever--but > with the memories you had at a much earlier date, not at time of freezing or > whatever. Have "you" survived? > I deal with this too. It's a variation of what has been called the "age-regression problem." Based on this it is possible that "you" at one stage in your life could give rise to more than one continuer later, which I don't see as a fundamental problem. Loss of memories is another problem. Sometimes this does not seem serious. I lose a great deal of minor information each time I sweep a rug, pertaining to the configuration of dust particles I can see on the floor, etc., but it doesn't bother me, and in fact seems a good thing. The way I deal with this issue, and loss or alteration of memories more generally, involves what I call "convergence to an ideal self," a process that takes place over infinite (subjective) time, assuming that literal immortality is achievable. Some information can be lost or changed along the way, but a growing body must endure permanently, to define the continuing individual. > It isn't good enough to shrug and say it's a matter of personal opinion or > personal values, or that we can never know the "real" answer, or that there > isn't any "true" answer. It is certainly possible that the final answer, when > we find it, will be unpalatable, but there IS an answer. Every question, > SUFFICIENTLY WELL FORMED, has an unambiguous, objective answer. (That is my > "religion" at any rate.) > > I'm certainly not complaining about speculation--the more the better, provided > it is followed by analysis and experiment. But let's remember that speculation > should not be held as dogma or anything close to it. > In the book I offer "working hypotheses" rather than "dogma". But some firm positions are taken, for which I try to give adequate reasons. Recently I finished a rough draft of the book. I'm trying to make it less "rough" by tidying up references and other minor editing; then I hope to make it available for anyone wishing to review it, with due acknowledgement to be given for usable feedback. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=9205