X-Message-Number: 9225
From: Ettinger <>
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 1998 15:36:12 EST
Subject: comments on survival

Just a few more remarks should (to the relief of many) finish any semi-useful
contributions I have for now. (Much more, of course, when the book is
finished.)

1. I'll reiterate my main points first.

a) Most commentators on identity (or survival criteria) simply make
assertions, which they seem to feel have self-evident validity. In my opinion,
their validity is highly questionable, for specific reasons, which I have
spelled out from time to time. The assertions in fact merely reflect the
speakers' impressions or preferences. The issue is not what seems right or
feels right or has plausibility; the issue is what can be PROVEN correct. So
far, as far as I can see, the answer is--nothing.

b) To change the aforesaid nothing to something, we need much more information
on HIGHLY RELEVANT matters. These include, by way of example, the self circuit
or mechanism of subjectivity, and the physics and biology of time. (As just
one possibility, if an advanced theory of relativistic universal quantum
theory shows that all systems and all space-time regions overlap in some
sense, then the whole viewpoint changes.) 

2. I always like to read Joe Strout's comments, partly because he almost
always understands mine. However, in his #9207, he says that some of my
thought experiments represent extremely unlikely situations. That is
irrelevant. Even extreme improbability of a hypothetical doesn't affect the
PRINCIPLE involved. 

I agree it is impossible that your grandchild could have memories very similar
to yours in detail; but if their QUALITY or psychological impact is closely
similar, so that the formed personality is a "dead ringer," some might say
that grandchild is (say) 60% you, and apparent absurdities follow. (See
previous.)

Joe also says that identity is not additive, so that if you have 1,000
descendants, each on average 1% you, you have survived at most only 1%, not
tenfold, because identity is not additive. Again, "not additive" is just an
assumption, not a proven fact. Personally, I find it equally easy (and equally
hard) to believe in additive identity as in identity of duplicates or identity
of an upload. 

Reminder: We cannot argue from definitions, because it is the definitions
themselves which are at issue. The question is what is APPROPRIATE in the
context of our total body of knowledge and our biological nature, as that
nature is and as it might become.

3. Joe says that a duplicate in another universe would be you--but that if you
or the duplicate is then hit by a bus, and the other not, survival of one
won't make much difference to the other. If he means it will not in practice
give much comfort, that is true, if we are talking about a culture much like
ours is now. If he means it OUGHT not give comfort, then he apparently is
contradicting himself. If these universes could somehow communicate, and if
the dying one knew the duplicate survived, and if he truly believed in
duplicate identity, then he ought to be comforted. The situation would not be
too much different from going under anaesthesia, with the confidence that
"you" will awaken safely. 

4. Joe then clarifies his position by affirming that he is interested only in
his own universe or time line. Again, this is merely a statement of
preference, not a presentation of evidence for a position--as he seems to
acknowledge by saying "I consider…"

5. Finally, Joe says that his quantitative or fuzzy-memory theory has never
met an objection that sticks, even though it allows duplication. Well, if
"sticks" means convincing him, that's his prerogative. But plenty of people
are unconvinced about duplicates, as well as other aspects of the quantitative
view that I have mentioned, in addition to all the other problems.
(Incidentally, it is hard for me to see why one should be comforted by a
duplicate in this universe or time line, but not in another.)

6. Thomas Donaldson (#9218) says that "…we consider that we have continued if
those memories important to us survive." (Presumably he means in the same
brain.) Again, just his hypothesis or preference or guess, with a little
plausibility and nothing more. Have you never heard of error, Thomas? What if
the memories you now deem important "really" aren't? If he means our survival
depends on the survival of the "really" important memories, regardless of our
current opinion, this is still just a guess or impression or preference. Look
again at the infant/oldster gap.

7. Rafael Haftka had asked opinions concerning survival and the distant
future, when you might have very little in common--perhaps nothing but
physical continuity, if that--with your earlier selves. This has often been
asked (frog, Greta Garbo, superman,……). The answer, yet again, is that
currently there is no answer. 

As Mike Perry says (#9219), our most basic want is just to feel good (glossing
over vast complications and deep subtleties that I deal with elsewhere). This
probably means maximizing feel-good over future time, appropriately weighted.
But the feel-good you want to maximize is YOURS, and for the present we can
only hope that YOU will continue or be reconstituted (if reconstitution is
acceptable).

On the practical level, the answer to Haftka's problem, and our general
problem of survival and values, is just to continue to try to live and learn
and enjoy and improve, then biostasis by means that best combine minimal
damage and maximum reliability of storage etc., and then…..to continue to try
to live and learn and enjoy and improve.

Robert Ettinger
Cryonics Institute
Immortalist Society
http://www.cryonics.org  

P.S. Anybody see "Virtual Obsession" (from Peter James' cryonics novel, HOST)
on ABC an evening or two ago? I forgot to watch. Any good?

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