X-Message-Number: 9299
Date:  Mon, 16 Mar 98 16:42:32 
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #9284 - #9292

Once again, I'll say that these discussions on philosophical issues 
are interesting and, I think, important. But certain people, I 
suspect, are grinding their teeth in frustration and wishing they 
could be spared things  not tied more closely
to the main theme of cryonics. If 
this is the feeling, then again maybe we should have another forum 
devoted specially to immortalist philosophy. My time is far
from unlimited, but I'm willing to volunteer assistance
toward such a project, if there is interest. ( I don't have
experience with this and would be on 
a learning curve, and there could be technical difficulties, but I'm 
willing to give it a try.)

Responding to Thomas's recent postings:

As for the Turing machine "counterexample" of Siegelmann, I (too) 
don't see it as that at all, because nobody has shown how to build 
the sort of device described, nor is it clear at all that such a 
device could be built consistent with our physics, and in fact the 
contrary seems more likely. A simpler TM counterexample of sorts 
could be my scenario involving recovering the successive digits of 
dimensionless constants, if these happen to be non-computable, but 
even here a "digital" paradigm would still appear to hold, as I've 
noted.

As for neurons and my state of knowledge thereof, I'll give them 
credit for being wonderful, and suprisingly complex devices, and 
acknowledge I'm a non-expert and that it would be desirable for me to 
have more knowledge. I am aware of the large number of connections of 
a neuron with surrounding neurons (10,000-100,000 connections or 
something on that order I think). But a neuron and a brain are 
constructs made of atoms, thus in priniciple ought to be emulable at 
the quantum level in a computer. I think that holds regardless of how 
complex either structure may be, and that it has philosophical 
implications worth considering, apart from whether such an emulation 
would ever be practical or desirable.

Thomas also raises the issue of whether a speedup in our thinking 
would be desirable, and this is a good issue to raise. Certainly it 
should not be considered a foregone conclusion that "faster is 
better." With a slowdown, for example, other factors being equal, 
you'd perhaps view the world like time-lapse photography, and see 
more happening per subjective second, which could possibly make life 
more interesting to you. On the other hand, we can imagine some 
possible advantages of a speedup too: you could get your work done 
faster (but make sure you are not paid by the hour!) and have a lot 
more time for leisure activites. If the speedup was really huge, say 
a factor of a million, the realtime world would mostly look frozen 
solid, so you might want to arrange for other entertainments, 
interactions with other speeded-up people, say, along with various VR 
options. Speeding up would be somewhat related to increasing your 
intelligence, though not a guarantee of (much of) the latter; the 
quality of your processing would matter too. But I think that, if 
speedups become possible, safe, reasonable, etc. many or most
would want them simply to keep up with things and not be in the 
position of requiring special consideration or protection from an 
"establishment" who might otherwise take advantage of them.

An interesting science fiction novel that deals with the speedup 
issue is *Nanotime* by Bart Kosko.

As for the "health" issue, if we became computer programs, I'll 
acknowledge we'll still be vulnerable to some things such as 
computer viruses. But I think overall our ailments will be more 
treatable than today--so many more options ought to be available
for treatment--even simple editing.

Thomas also raises the issue of whether biological wetware could 
really be superseded by any artificial medium. Certainly we haven't 
demonstrated this. But as for things like 
self-repair, I don't see so much superiority here. The brain isn't 
particularly good at replacing damaged parts. Moreover, 
though memories are stored 
redundantly in the brain, computers seem superior in providing for 
"restarting" after hardware failure, since programs can be copied and 
stored on hard drives, and physical components are standardized to be easy to 
replace. Wetware has evolved under certain constraints that will not 
apply in the future, e.g. that at each stage of the 
evolutionary process, it must produce an organism capable of and 
interesed in reproducing its kind. And  in certain ways our
wetware is deeply flawed, as the aging process demonstrates. Overall, 
it's hard to imagine that something developed by an unconscious
process cannot be improved upon for our special 
needs, and I think it will be.

Best to all,

Mike Perry

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