X-Message-Number: 9304
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 1998 09:41:17 -0800
From: "Joseph J. Strout" <>
Subject: on hydrogen and persons

In Message #9295, Robert Ettinger <> writes:

>Using appropriate quantum terminology and spacetime coordinates, I describe a
>hydrogen atom, far out in intergalactic space, in its lowest energy state;
>then I describe a photon coming along and exciting the atom. This might be
>done on a Turing tape; or I might just use words spoken aloud. Have I, in some
>sense, created a hydrogen atom? When I stop talking, or the tape stops moving,
>does the atom go back to oblivion?
>
>Unless an info person claims that my story does indeed constitute the PHYSICAL
>CREATION of a hydrogen atom (even though one of a different sort, in a
>different "universe"), he must recant on the person emulation thesis.

Not at all.  Your conclusion would be true if a person were a physical
object, like a hydrogen atom.  The argument would be:

1. A description does not create or constitute a physical object.
2. A person is a physical object.
3. Therefore, a description does not create or constitute a person.

The logic here is correct, but premise #2 is false, so the conclusion is
false as well.  A person is NOT a physical object.  A person is a set of
habits, personality traits, memories, skills, quirks, loves, hates, and so
on.  (Without intending to cloud the issue, treating a person as a physical
object strikes me as not only logically questionable, but probably immoral
as well.)

Instead of comparing a person to a hydrogen atom, you should compare him to
a story.  Using appropriate language, words, and turns of phrase, I
describe the story of Moby Dick in complete detail, starting with "Call me
Ishmael" and proceeding to the end, with all the characters, action, and
words of the original.  Have I, in some sense, instantiated the Moby Dick
story?  Of course I have!  Is it the same story written by Herman Melville?
Of course it is!

This confusion between a physical object and its information content is, I
believe, the underlying cause of most of the confusion regarding personal
identity.  If I have a copy of Moby Dick lying on my desk, I can treat it
as an object, or I can treat it as a story.  Both views are correct in some
sense, but one rather misses the point.

As an object, it is unique, uncopyable, and irreplacable; if it gets tossed
in the fireplace, it is gone forever.  I should morn such a loss very
greatly.

As a story, it is one instance with many identical duplicates.  It is
copyable (the trusty Xerox machine could do the job, with enough patience);
it can even be uploaded into my computer via a scanner, and still remain
the same story.  If my copy falls into the fire, I am only out the few
bucks it will take to go to the bookstore and buy another copy -- the new
copy is just as good as the original, because they are *the same story*.

With a book, it is obvious (isn't it?) that the story is the more important
and appropriate criterion for identity, rather than the physical object
embodying it.  With a person, which is more important -- his hopes, dreams,
memories, and personality, or the hydrogen (and other) atoms he's made of?

,------------------------------------------------------------------.
|    Joseph J. Strout           Department of Neuroscience, UCSD   |
|               http://www-acs.ucsd.edu/~jstrout/  |
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