X-Message-Number: 9502 From: (John P. Pietrzak) Newsgroups: sci.cryonics Subject: Re: Pietrzak 2 Date: Fri, 17 Apr 1998 03:50:06 GMT Message-ID: <> References: <> Continuing our discussion on "Cryonics: The Probability of Rescue" (a paper which can be found on the CI website), On 16 Apr 1998 14:04:54 GMT, (Ettinger) wrote: ['He' refers here to me] >He points to the Michelson-Morley experiment, which failed to prove the >existence of the ether. Actually, the "goal" of any experiment designed >as a tool of theory is just to prove, disprove, or modify the theory; so >M-M did not fail. The goal of the MM experiment was to prove the existence of the ether, a material whose existence seemed so intuitive from the actions of light as to be obvious. In it's failure to do so, it produced one of the more important discoveries of this century (although already suggested by Einstein), but that doesn't take away from the fact that it _failed_ in it's goal. (Closer to home: would you say that an attempt to cryonically suspend and restore a human being which failed would be a success, scientifically?) >But saying goal of "science" was dumb; I should have said goal of "technology." >That is, we are talking about practical goals, based on known fundamental >science. Taking the step from "science" to "technology" gains you nothing. The reason why engineering is such a highly valued and sought-after trade is that the transformation of scientific concepts into real-world structures is not trivial. Some things just plain don't work. (For example: We understand in great detail how birds fly, but (to my knowledge) there has never been a successful ornithopter (wing-powered flying vehicle) built that can carry human passengers: the load on the materials making up the wings has always been too great.) >John repeats that there are no samples on which to base cryonics probabilities, >and that my focus was on situations where there are few samples. Both >statements are wrong. > >Looking first at the second part, my approach to probability applies to ANY >situation, few samples or many. Naturally, many is better. p. 6: 'We seek to show that the dominant frequency theory of probability can be applied in an extremely simple and natural way so as to include "single events" and "subjective" probability.' p. 7: important feature #3 involves two types of "isolated events" used within theories of probability. pp. 8-9: Both the bettor example and the Illiad/Odyssey example are provided in the context of single-event probability measures w.r.t. external (a priori) knowledge of the subject at hand. pp. 13-14: Both the shaman example and the ESP example involve single events considered using probabilistic approaches both with and without a priori knowledge. p. 16: (in the conclusion of the Exponential Life Parameter section) '[...] If however some important decision, such as the letting of a contract or installation of military equipment, rests (for some reason) on a single sampling, then the situation is essentially different. [...] Hence, the Classical Bayes approach is required, and any other is a poor substitute.' The interest in single events here is (IMO) indicated by that last quote from page 16: It is in exactly those cases where few samples are to be had, that the Classical Bayesian approach can perform better than other approaches. Only by bringing Classical Bayesian probability into the discussion can a priori knowledge be used explicitly, and only in the use of a priori knowledge can we appeal directly to intuition. Otherwise, why talk about single events at all? (Surely you believe that more than one experiment in cryonics will be completed? If so, the need for Bayes goes away.) Of course, you're now appealing to the use of prior experience as full-fledged samples, rather than as Bayesian "a priori" knowledge: >Now PLEASE focus hard. Whether we can find samples--prior experience--depends >on how we define the "event" and the sequence of experiments. For example, what >is the probability that the plane will crash on your planned flight across >country? You COULD say there is no background of experience, no prior samples, >because every flight is different. Flights with the precise characteristics of >yours have never occurred before. Would you therefore say that probability >theory is inapplicable? Of course not. [...] In spite of the slightly loose links, >that experience is highly relevant and much better than nothing. > >So it is with cryonics and the history of goals of technology. Ok, let me summarize here: The event: the effort to succeed with goal of technology (in this case, a successful use of cryonics). The experiments: the entire history of efforts to successfully complete goals of technology. The pitch: essentially, "cryonics w.r.t. other goals of technology is analogous to an aircraft flight w.r.t. other aircraft flights." (*Good choice*, go with something which has an excellent statistical record of success.) On the linkage: look, I've been on flights before. You think these mass-produced vehicles, following the same pre-defined routes multiple times every day for years, using standardized fuels and following standardized maintenance schemes, are only loosely linked? (Not that I enjoy flying all that much, no matter what the statistics say.) And, no matter what you believe about the links between flights, how can you believe there is any similarity at all between goals of technology? The development of the pencil and the pyramid had the same chance of success? The toothpick and the Saturn V were both as likely to occur? As to the success record on goals of technology: >Overwhelming experience--the sweep of history--tells us that goals >of technology are highly likely to be met. Can you offer any proof of this? Can you show that more goals have succeeded than failed? (A quick browse through the federal patent office files would probably give an exceedingly low success rate to the goals of technology, so far as I've heard.) Finally, to sum up: >Once more: even though this estimate is very imprecise, it is >nevertheless highly relevant and thoroughly scientific. Once more: Your assessment of the probability that cryonics will work is based _solely_ upon your own intuition of how the world works. Your overwhelming experience with the sweep of history is all you have to back up your claims. Thus, you believe that cryonics will succeed _because_ you believe that cryonics will succeed. John Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=9502