X-Message-Number: 23054
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2003 14:19:50 -0500
Subject: Re: The Immortal's Dilemma: Deconstructing Eternal Life
From: Allan Randall <>
Scott:
I posted a critique to this article in their feedback section, which I
reproduce below for anyone interested. Thanks for bringing the article
to our attention!
Allan
=====
George Hart's defence of mortalism seems rather empty to me... he tries
to reduce the field to a small number of possibilities where there are
actually a vast number, and then tries to convince us that there is
some dilemma in only being able to choose from this small number of
possibilities that he has picked out for us. It is a rigged game. A few
specific comments:
(1) There is no reason to discount the possibility of living forever
and never wanting to die. The result would not need to be anything like
"eternal bliss"... it could even contain moments of extreme sadness.
But there is no inconsistency in imagining an infinite life with no
moments of suicidal thoughts. Suicide simply might not be in such a
person's nature. I'm not saying that this would be the case for me, but
thus far in life I've never had a suicidal thought, and I see no reason
to *assume* given an infinite life that I would have any such thoughts,
let alone some unacceptable number of them. The infinite sequence
"01001000100001000001..." contains no two consecutive 1's. If we
imagine "living" this sequence, perhaps we would have to admit the
"possibility" of two consecutive ones (since we never have proof that
the sequence won't suddenly produce two of them), but that does not
mean that this "possibility" implies that the two 1's will *certainly*
show up. "Possible" in actual use does not always mean "actually
physically possible"... it more often means "possible given my current
state of ignorance". If Hart thinks it means "actually physically
possible" (as in "will definitely happen given enough time"), then this
is not a warranted assumption with respect to suicide or suicidal
thoughts, nor one for which eternal bliss is the only alternative.
(2) Hart says that "the option of termination, to be an option, must
mean that it is both logically and empirically possible to exercise the
option". In the "actually physically possible" sense that he means
this, I think this is a bit of a stretch. An option can still be an
option with respect to human choice and freedom, even if it is not in
that person's nature to exercise the option. I can be free to do that
which is not in my nature to do, and which I will therefore never
actually do. I am still *free* to do it. At least, this is what people
ordinarily mean by "being free to choose". If Hart means something else
by having the "option", then his point becomes rather mundane and,
well, pointless. The upshot of all this is that there is no
inconsistency or dilemma involved in the idea of living forever, while
being free to opt out, but never actually choosing to do so.
(3) Hart seems to assume that a total infinite amount of time spent
wishing death is unacceptable. He neglects the fact that if such time
is tiny compared to the amount of time spent loving life, then it could
be perfectly acceptable. Life for an immortal will *never be* a
completed infinity. We will never have experienced an infinite amount
of suicidal thinking. The infinite sequence "00001000010000100001..."
contains only about 1/5th the number of 1's as 0's after any large but
finite time period. True, "after an infinite time" it will contain the
same number of 1's and 0's... but "after an infinite time" is not
really a meaningful notion. If I am "living" this sequence, I will
never experience infinite time. I will always have lived a finite
amount of time... forever. So I will always, forever, be experiencing
an overall average of 1/5th of the time spent in "1". By analogy, if
1/1000000th of my time in eternity is spent being unhappy, even
contemplating suicide, this seems quite acceptable to me. Life is not
perfectly happy. Why should I require eternal absolute bliss to make
eternal life worth living? I do not require 100% satisfaction with life
to make it worth living now, when it is finite, so why should it be any
different when it is infinite?
(4) Harts says that even if we experience an infinite number of
blissful moments through eternity, then "eventually the experiences
must become repetitive. And in eternity the repetition must be
infinite." By his own admission, this assumes that there is a finite
limit to mental or neurological capacity. But this is not a valid
assumption. Note that to allow the possibility of no limit to mental
capacity does *not* mean we must allow the possibility of infinite
mental capacity. If I live forever, with my mental capacity growing
without limit, and the variety of my potential experience growing with
it exponentially, I will still only ever have a finite neurological
capacity at any given time. My brain will never become infinite.
(5) Hart argues that if one's mental capacity increases to allow one to
remember enough of one's life to make immortality meaningful, then one
will necessarily become so different as to not be oneself anymore.
Hence, one will eventually become essentially a different person,
anyway, given enough time, if one does not actually die or just fade
away. But he provides no real argument for this... it is just a bald
assertion. Right now I am very different from when I was 5, but I still
feel a strong sense of ego-coherence with that 5 year old. To some
extent, self-identity is an "illusion" anyway, but then so are all our
mental constructs to some extent. If I feel after a trillion trillion
years (or whatever) that I am the same person, and I self-identify with
this past self, having legitimate memories of being that self, then who
is Hart to say I have become a "different" person due solely to the
extent of my change? Personal growth and change is already part of the
human equation, and we don't think it makes us "mortal", just because
we have changed alot from when we were 5! Keep in mind, that if our
minds are expanding as time goes on, our ability to maintain
ego-coherence in the face of passing time might also expand. This is
very speculative, of course, but no more so than Hart's claim that the
ego will necessarily decohere. We need a better theory of consciousness
and self-identity to really answer such questions, I think.
(6) Hart says that "over time, each experience becomes less
significant, literally to an infinitesimal degree". But even if we
accept his mathematical model of "experience significance", the state
of "infinitesimal significance" will never actually be reached. Each of
an ever-expanding list of experiences could each still maintain some
degree of significance. But quite aside from this, his model is
arbitrary. If our capacity expands, our ability to place significance
on individual events in the face of an increasing number of memories
might well expand as well. Again, this increasing mental capacity in no
way implies any point in time at which we have infinite capacity, or an
infinite number of experiences to deal with.
(7) The oft-repeated statement that it is mortality that "frames" life
and gives it meaning is, of course, a value statement, based on
personal aesthetics, and not really open to rational debate, at least
not at this time. One might argue, of course, that the immortalist is
just kidding himself, and if actually presented with immortality, would
find his life losing much of its meaning just as the mortalist had
claimed. But, until some sort of immortality becomes a reality, this is
pure speculation. Likewise, the immortalist might claim that, once
presented with the real possibility of immortality, the mortalist would
actually grab it with gusto, and it would end up enhancing the meaning
in his life, and that his mortalism will turn out to have been simply
sour grapes all along. Again, however, this is equally speculative. My
own opinion is that such mortalists are playing the sour grapes game...
but that is just a hunch and one I cannot back up. Certainly, Hart's
feeling that the thought of a trillion or trillion trillion years of
life is "mind-numbing and nauseating" is a personal aesthetic I don't
share. I love life, do not want it to end, and think a trillion years
of it would likely be not only meaningful and intensely fulfilling, but
quite a lot of fun! A "trillion trillion" years I have a harder time
conceiving of in my imagination, as it is such a vast span of time, but
I see no reason to presume that it could not also be fulfilling and
happy, perhaps in ways I cannot currently conceive of.
(8) Hart does not outright state, but comes close to assuming in
places, that a belief or hope in immortality implies a belief that
mortal life is meaningless. Just to be clear: not everyone who believes
in or hopes for immortality believes that a mortal life is meaningless.
I hope for immortality, but would still consider a mortal life of 75
years to be shot through with meaning, and potentially very fulfilling.
It is because I find mortal life so meaningful and fulfilling that I
would like to extend it as much as possible, and make it that much more
meaningful and fulfilling. Death would be a tragic end to a meaningful
life, and thus something to be avoided, but not something that robs
life of any meaning at all. Hart says "Yet it appears when it is all
said and done, there is no version of personal immortality that can
supply a meaningful life that a mortal existence could not also
supply." I think he has failed to show why immortality might not
provide a *more* meaningful and fulfilling life. But I'd agree with him
if all he means is that life can be meaningful even in the face of
death (although his piece seems generally much more pro-death than just
that).
(9) "It is our mortality that makes life precious and intentional
killing especially wrong." Hart stays away from ethics for the most
part, but this brief reference to it I find the most bizarre part of
the essay. Why would the ability to live forever make life less
precious or less worth preserving or murder any less heinous (presuming
it were still possible)? He does not elaborate or defend the remark to
any significant extent, so I can only puzzle over why he would believe
such a thing.
(10) A note on terminology: many people consider that immortality with
the option of opting out is still "immortality", even if the person
does eventually opt out. The word "immortal" does not have the absolute
connotations that "eternal life" has, of necessarily meaning absolutely
infinite life. It often allows for more limited notions like "at least
as long as the universe itself exists", or "as long as the person
chooses" or even just "with no definite time limit". Hart, for much of
his essay, seems to be addressing an extremely absolutist idea of
immortality, so it might be clearer to say that he is talking about the
concept of "eternal life" rather than "immortality". On the other hand,
his closing comments do seem to me to place value on a known and
definable time limit to life.
Hart does provide an interesting and articulate initial set of
positions for the immortalist to argue against. But I do not think he
succeeds as yet in actually arguing very far for most of them.
--
Allan Randall, , http://www.elea.org/
"Whatever can be thought of or spoken of necessarily IS, since it is
possible for it to be, but it is not possible for NOTHING to be." --
Parmenides of Elea, c. 475 B.C.
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